Security architecture

Security built around explicit trust boundaries.

A security architecture is only useful to a technical evaluator if its limits are stated as carefully as its properties. What follows describes how Tunnel protects communication, which component holds which authority, and which exposures remain.

  • Endpoint cryptography
  • Device trust
  • Mission authority
  • Relay custody

The invariant

The authority that permits communication does not possess the keys required to decrypt communication.

This separation is structural rather than promised. The authority to communicate is expressed as a signature. Content confidentiality comes from a key agreement. Signing authority and key agreement are different key roles, on different curves, with different lifetimes. Holding the first cannot produce the second.

How Mobile, Command and Relay relateTunnel Command issues signed authority to devices: enrollment, mission membership and communication authority. Tunnel Mobile encrypts content on the endpoint and hands sealed bundles to Tunnel Relay. Relay carries and delivers bundles without holding payload decryption keys. Command does not receive message content and holds no payload keys.Tunnel CommandMission and device authoritysigned authoritysigned authorityTunnel MobileSender endpointTunnel MobileRecipient endpointTunnel RelaySealed custodySECURE MISSION BUNDLE · SEALED IN TRANSITPayload keys are derived on the endpoints only. No Command instance or relay contributes key material.
Authority flows down from Command. Content flows across between endpoints. The two paths do not meet: the authority that permits communication does not possess the keys required to decrypt it.

01 · Endpoint cryptography

Content is protected where the operator is, not where the server is.

Payload keys are derived on the endpoints. Key establishment combines an X25519 agreement with an ML-KEM-768 encapsulation, so that a recording made today is not opened later by an adversary with a quantum capability against the classical half alone.

  • Hybrid post-quantum cryptography is incorporated into the platform architecture: ML-KEM-768 combined with X25519 in key establishment.
  • ML-KEM-768 is the mechanism standardized as FIPS 203. Tunnel implements FIPS-standardized algorithms; that is not the same as validation of a cryptographic module, and Tunnel does not describe it as such.
  • Signature authentication uses Ed25519. Post-quantum signature migration is a separate matter from post-quantum key establishment, and Tunnel keeps the two claims distinct.
  • Message content is encrypted before relay custody, and stays sealed for the whole journey.

Key roles

The most damaging simplification available in this domain is calling all of these “the identity key”. They have different algorithms, different protection classes, different lifetimes and different revocation semantics.

Cryptographic key roles in the Tunnel platform
RoleAlgorithmPurpose and lifetime
Device-binding keyNIST P-256 ECDSAProves this specific device and authenticates it to the deployment. Generated inside the platform's secure element where one is present, and not exportable. Rotated only by re-enrollment.
Protocol signing keyEd25519Sender authentication on a Secure Mission Bundle. It signs. It has no key-agreement surface and cannot produce one.
Protocol agreement keyX25519The classical half of hybrid key establishment. Rotatable independently of the other roles.
Post-quantum KEM keyML-KEM-768The post-quantum half of hybrid key establishment. Rotatable independently.
Payload keyDerived, per sessionDerived on the endpoints from the agreement and encapsulation results. It exists only at the endpoints, and no administrative component contributes an input to its derivation.
Mission-authority signing keyEd25519Held by the issuing authority to sign who may communicate. It carries no agreement or decapsulation capability, so holding it does not yield a payload key.
Relay custody capability keyIssued capabilityAuthorizes one specific relay operation, such as upload, retrieval or acknowledgement, as a separate authority. It does not authorize reading.

02 · Device trust

Key protection is stated per platform, per algorithm, per key.

'Hardware-backed' is ambiguous and Tunnel does not use it as a claim. Android Keystore is an interface, not a location. A TEE is not a discrete secure element. StrongBox supports a narrower algorithm set than the TEE around it, not a wider one. The Apple Secure Enclave is none of those things. Tunnel states which protection class applies, where.

Hardware-generated, non-exportable
Generated inside the secure element, never existed outside it, with no interface that extracts it. An attacker must break the secure element.
Hardware-resident
Generated and used inside the secure element, relying on the platform's own guarantee rather than an additional Tunnel assertion. An attacker must break the secure element.
Hardware-wrapped
A software key encrypted at rest under a hardware-resident key, and therefore plaintext in process memory while it is in use. An attacker must execute code in the process while it runs.
Software-protected
Protected by the operating system keystore or application encryption, with no hardware root. An attacker must read the filesystem with sufficient privilege.

The distinction that matters most is between the hardware-resident classes and hardware-wrapped. A hardware-wrapped key resists an attacker who steals storage. It does not resist an attacker executing code in the process, because the key must be plaintext in memory to be used.

03 · Enrollment authority

Trust begins with an authorized act, not an email address.

A device becomes trusted because the organization's own authority says so, in a signed statement, at a moment that is recorded. In a sovereign deployment that authority is a root the customer generated and holds.

01

Controlled provisioning

Enrollment is a deliberate, authorized exchange rather than a self-service action, and it is recorded as such.
02

Per-device binding

The device-binding key is generated on the device it belongs to and does not leave it, so enrollment binds a device rather than an account.
03

Customer-held root

In a sovereign deployment the enrollment root is generated and held by the customer, optionally in customer-managed hardware security modules.

04 · Message confidentiality

What is sealed, and what has to be readable to deliver it.

A bundle is split so that the question 'what does the infrastructure learn?' has a short answer that can be checked rather than trusted.

Anatomy of a Secure Mission BundleA Secure Mission Bundle is the transport-independent encrypted unit Tunnel uses to protect and deliver operational communication. A routing envelope visible to the relay carries only a directional delivery alias, custody policy, priority and expiration. A sealed inner section, readable only by authorized recipients, carries sender authentication, mission and compartment context, transport restrictions and the encrypted content itself.ROUTING ENVELOPE · VISIBLE TO RELAYDirectional delivery aliasmission-scoped, non-enumerableCustody policystore, forward, expirePriorityscheduling classCreation and expirationsigned validity windowReplay and duplicate guardsingle-acceptance markersCryptographic suitealgorithm identificationSEALSEALED SECTION · AUTHORIZED RECIPIENTS ONLYEncrypted message contenttext, files, voice notesSender authenticationsignature over the assertionAuthorized-recipient policywho may open itMission and compartmentoperational contextCommunication authoritydirectional, time-limitedTransport restrictionspermitted carriage
The relay reads the outer envelope in order to carry, schedule and expire the bundle. It does not hold the keys required to open the sealed section.

05 · Mission authority

Authorization is scoped, directional and finite.

Authority is issued for a mission, in a direction, for a capability, for a period. Each device receives only the authorizations naming itself, so no endpoint learns the mission topology.

Mission-scoped communication authorityAn operator holds a separate mission-scoped pseudonymous identity in each mission. Authority to communicate is directional and issued per edge: authority to reach one counterpart in one mission does not create authority to reach a different counterpart, or the same counterpart in a different mission. Each device learns only its own edges, never the mission topology.MISSION AOperatorpseudonym A-1Counterpartpseudonym A-2two directional grantsexpires with the missionMISSION BSame operatorpseudonym B-1Counterpartpseudonym B-4one directional grantno reply authority issuedThe same person in two missions is two unrelated operational identities.Neither mission's authority carries into the other.The mission authority signs who may communicate. It holds no key-agreement material and cannot derive payload keys.
Authorization is scoped to a mission, a direction, a capability and a validity window. It expires on its own, and it can be revoked.
  • The mission authority holds a signing key only. It has no key-agreement or decapsulation surface, and therefore cannot derive a payload key.
  • Adding a signed authorization to a bundle changes what a relay may refuse to carry. It does not change what a relay may read.
  • A capability is bound to a subject device: a capability copied onto another device does not function there.
  • Tunnel governs relationships inside the platform. It does not, and does not claim to, prevent two people who know each other's external identity from communicating outside it.

06 · Relay custody

The relay is authorized to carry, and separately authorized for each operation.

Possession of a delivery alias does not authorize a relay operation. Upload, retrieval and acknowledgement are separate authorities, and the operation is named inside the issuer's signature.

  • Relay infrastructure is not designed to possess payload decryption keys.
  • Custody policy, priority and expiration travel with the bundle.
  • Replay markers and duplicate suppression bound single acceptance.
  • Bundles past their validity window are refused rather than delivered late.

07 · Metadata minimization

Reduced, bounded and described, not eliminated.

Minimization is a real property and it is not anonymity. Tunnel reduces what persists and what correlates; it does not claim to remove what a network observer can see.

Reduced
Persistent identity and relationship metadata are minimized according to deployment profile. Mission-scoped addressing reduces persistent relationship exposure, turning a durable identified edge list into a scoped one.
Bounded
What relay infrastructure persists is limited to what custody and delivery require, and is subject to the retention policy of the deployment, which the customer controls in a sovereign deployment.
Remaining
Network-layer metadata such as source address, timing, ciphertext size and session continuity remains observable. So does the fact that an authenticated device connected.
Not claimed
Tunnel does not claim network anonymity, zero metadata, an eliminated traffic graph or unlinkable mission activity against a live network observer.

08 · Revocation

Withdrawal is real, and it is bounded.

Each device holds its own credentials and its own authorizations, so a device can be withdrawn on its own. A device that is out of contact cannot apply state it has not received; the signed validity window is what bounds that exposure.

Device loss and revocationEach enrolled device holds its own credentials and its own authorizations. When a device is revoked in Tunnel Command, new signed state withdraws that device's authority. Connected devices apply it on receipt. A disconnected device applies it when it next receives newer signed state, or when its existing authority reaches the end of its validity window, whichever comes first. The operator's other devices are unaffected.Tunnel Commandrevocation issuedOperator device 2unaffected, retains authorityRevoked deviceauthority withdrawnDisconnected deviceapplies on next contactcredentials are per deviceno reuse on another devicebounded by validity windowA credential bound to one device does not function if it is copied to another.
Revocation is bounded rather than instantaneous: a device that is out of contact cannot apply state it has not yet received. The signed validity window bounds that exposure.

Revocation takes effect when the device receives newer signed state, or at authorization expiration, whichever comes first. Tunnel does not claim immediate revocation of a disconnected device.

09 · Sovereign control

The strongest available reduction in third-party dependency.

In a sovereign deployment the infrastructure, the enrollment authority, the enrollment authority, the audit domain and the update process are all customer-held. There is no universal Tunnel master key and no permanent vendor access capable of decrypting customer content.

  • Cryptographic roots generated and held by the customer, optionally in customer-managed HSMs.
  • Air-gapped installation with an offline signed update process.
  • Role separation so that no single administrative role holds the whole of the authority.
  • Customer-controlled logging, retention and audit review.

10 · Deployment dependencies and stated limits

What the architecture depends on, and what it does not cover.

Every property above rests on something. These are the dependencies and the exposures that remain, stated so that an evaluator does not have to discover them.

Endpoint integrity
Device compromise is contained through device-specific credentials, authorization and revocation policies. It is not eliminated. An adversary in control of an unlocked device with content displayed defeats cryptography, and Tunnel does not claim otherwise.
Platform secure elements
Protection class depends on what the device platform provides. Assurance is stated per platform, per algorithm and per security level rather than as a single claim.
Network observation
Source address, timing, size and session continuity remain observable at the network layer regardless of deployment model.
Transport partners
Radio-layer performance and protection depend on qualified communications hardware and integration partners. Tunnel makes no claim about low probability of intercept or detection, frequency hopping, jamming resistance or waveform protection.
Displayed content
Content that has already been displayed or copied is beyond the platform's reach. Tunnel does not claim recall, unsending or secure deletion of previously viewed information.
Media remanence
Keys are destroyed on command and compartment material is removed. Physical media remanence is addressed by the customer's media handling policy, not by a platform claim.
Authorization outside the platform
Tunnel governs relationships inside the platform. It cannot prevent contact conducted outside it.
External authorization
Tunnel holds no government authorization. It is not NSA approved, not CSfC listed, not NIAP or Common Criteria certified, not FedRAMP authorized, and does not use a CMVP-validated cryptographic module. No approval for classified information is represented.

Reporting a vulnerability

Security researchers and customer security teams can reach the Tunnel security function directly at security@tunnelmessenger.com. Please do not include operational secrets, credentials or classified material in an initial report.

Product configurations, integrations and operational capabilities are delivered according to customer requirements, deployment environment, validation scope and applicable authorization. No approval for classified information is represented.

Next step

Bring your own threat model.

A security architecture review is one of the most common reasons organizations request a briefing. Come with the questions your evaluator will ask.