Tunnel Mobile
The native endpoint where operators actually work.
Tunnel Mobile supports the approved capabilities and policies of the customer's Tunnel deployment on native Android and iOS. Content is encrypted and decrypted on the device. Credentials belong to the device. Nothing about the operator's communication requires trusting the infrastructure that carries it.
- Native Android
- Native iOS
- Device-bound credentials
- Offline capable
What operators get
A communication surface, not a security exercise.
The security architecture is the point, but it is not the experience. An operator opens the application and communicates; the platform enforces what the organization decided.
Secure messaging
Secure files and voice notes
Mission-scoped identity
Disconnected operation
Controlled provisioning
Multi-device, separately trusted
On the device
Cryptography happens where the operator is.
Tunnel Mobile derives content keys on the endpoint. The platform's administrative components have no part in that derivation, and the relay carries the result without the means to open it.
- Device-binding key
- A P-256 key that proves this specific device. It is generated inside the platform's secure element where one is present, is not exportable, and authenticates the device to the deployment.
- Protocol signing key
- An Ed25519 key used for sender authentication on a Secure Mission Bundle. It signs; it never participates in key agreement.
- Protocol agreement key
- An X25519 key forming the classical half of hybrid key establishment.
- Post-quantum KEM key
- An ML-KEM-768 key forming the post-quantum half. No secure element on any current platform supports ML-KEM, so this key is hardware-wrapped rather than hardware-resident, and Tunnel states it that way.
- Payload key
- Derived on the endpoints from the agreement and encapsulation results. It exists only at the endpoints. No administrative component contributes an input to it.
Device lifecycle
A device that is lost is a device that can be withdrawn.
Because each device holds its own credentials and its own authorizations, withdrawing one device does not disturb the operator's other devices and does not require re-establishing the organization.
Revocation is bounded rather than instantaneous. A device that is out of contact applies withdrawal when it next receives newer signed state, or when its existing authority reaches the end of its validity window, whichever comes first.
Deployment profiles
One product family, separately governed builds.
Different deployment profiles require separately signed, configured and governed builds, because a managed deployment and a sovereign deployment are different trust domains. Externally this remains one product family: Tunnel Mobile.
- Deployment identity is fixed at build time, not chosen at runtime.
- A sovereign build accepts no commercial credential or endpoint.
- Signing identity and application identity stay separate per deployment.
- Policy distribution is signed and governed by the customer's authority.
Next step
See Tunnel Mobile in a deployment like yours.
A private briefing walks through the operator experience, the enrollment and revocation model, and how the client behaves when the network does not.